Ready or not, the UK faces threats everyday

Building national resilience can no longer be delayed

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Published 16 November 2026

Published 16 November 2026

The world is the most turbulent and insecure than it has been for decades. As a result, the UK faces catastrophic risks from multiple directions.

The UK must adopt a proactive, co-ordinated national approach.

Resilience is the collective ability of Government and society to anticipate and reduce risks, withstand disruption, maintain essential functions, respond effectively, recover and adapt

Resilience and preparedness need to become a normal part of everyday life - not issues considered only when a crisis occurs

Hostile states are carrying out activities that threaten the UK’s security and resilience, including cyber-attacks, proxy acts of violence and threats to undersea cables and pipelines.

The scale of the cyber threat is illustrated by the more than 90,000 attempted cyber-attacks on the UK’s defence systems each year.

Meanwhile, extreme weather and disruption to critical supply chains risk triggering cascading consequences across essential services, while advances in artificial intelligence are creating new and intensifying existing threats.

Despite the launch of its 'Be Ready' campaign, the Government appears complacent. Its arrangements are fragmented and often out of date.

Plans focus on individual emergencies rather than several happening at once, while preparation remains secondary to response and recovery.

We examined four key areas the UK needs to develop, to better ready itself for the risks that could already be heading its way.

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Russell - stock.adobe.com

Russell - stock.adobe.com

1. A Whole of Society approach

The Government has recognised the importance of an approach which provides a role for all actors within society.

But there is no clear national expectation of what preparedness should look like from central Government through to local organisations, businesses, communities and households.

“A shared vision must be co-owned across central government, devolved administrations, local government, public services, business and civil society, because delivery depends on action and capability across the whole system.”
The Centre for Whole of Society Resilience, in written evidence to us

Communities are not being fully integrated into the system.

The Government’s 2026 UK Public Survey of Risk Perception, Resilience and Preparedness found that 71% of people would volunteer to help their neighbourhood recover from an emergency.

Local resilience

Local Resilience Forums are multi-agency partnerships in England and Wales that bring together local authorities, emergency services and other organisations to plan for emergencies. Regional Resilience Partnerships and Emergency Preparedness Groups are the Scottish and Northern Irish equivalents.

Local Resilience Forums can help turn national policy into local capacity. But they have variable coverage, visibility, and involvement in planning.

These problems could be tackled by ensuring that they report to the police, receive sustainable funding, and are placed on a statutory footing.

The Government should review whether existing Local Resilience Forums in England and Wales, Regional Resilience Partnerships in Scotland, and Emergency Preparedness Groups in Northern Ireland provide sufficient coverage to support whole-of-society resilience at community level.

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IM Imagery - stock.adode.com

IM Imagery - stock.adode.com

2. The role of the private sector

More than 80% of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure is privately owned. However, businesses are not routinely represented in resilience planning and Small and Medium Enterprises receive little proportionate guidance.

“A key problem on the private sector side is that there is nothing in current legislation or policy that incentivises a company to do things in the national interest when it comes to resilience.”
Professor Nicola Ranger, Professor in Practice of Natural Capital, Risk and Finance at the London School of Economics, in oral evidence to us

Measures such as tax reliefs, cheaper insurance and contractual requirements could encourage greater private sector involvement in national resilience, alongside clearer statutory responsibilities for businesses providing essential services.

Supply chains also have highly concerning vulnerabilities. 95% of British retail food is supplied by only nine companies.

It needs consistent funding, skilled researchers and technical experts trained here or attracted to the UK, and well-funded research infrastructure to stay at the cutting edge.

The previous Government pledged to spend £2 billion over ten years on the engineering biology research and development sector – we will need at least this level of funding in order to keep up with investments that are being made by other countries.

Around 90% of global 6-APA, a key ingredient for penicillin-class antibiotics, is produced in China.

While the Government maintains stockpiles of some medicines, these may not be sufficient to withstand prolonged disruption, particularly where supplies are concentrated in a small number of countries. Any interruption could have serious consequences for the availability of vital medicines.

Such problems must be urgently addressed through stockpiling, building domestic capabilities and finding alternative sources for essentials.

The Government must urgently address these vulnerabilities by reviewing whether existing medicine stockpiles are sufficient to withstand prolonged disruption, identifying gaps and securing alternative sources of supply. It should also invest in rebuilding domestic manufacturing capacity for essential medicines and their ingredients, while working with international partners to diversify supply chains.

Insurance could play a greater role in mitigating risks. Government involvement is required in providing effective cover for risks that are difficult to insure, including large-scale cyber-attacks.

The Government should establish a tiered framework for business resilience, proportionate to the criticality, size and risk profile of organisations. Businesses whose continued operation is essential to national resilience should be subject to statutory preparedness and continuity duties and regular stress tests.

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IM Imagery - stock.adode.com

IM Imagery - stock.adode.com

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Josie Elias - stock.adobe.com

Josie Elias - stock.adobe.com

3. Better public communications

In October 2026, the Government announced a three-year 'Be Ready' campaign to improve public awareness of how to prepare for emergencies.

We welcome this announcement as a positive step, but the Government must now go much further to ensure that the public has the information, skills and support needed to prepare for and respond to emergencies.

Communications need to continue to function during major disruption.

However, back-up communications are not sufficiently available or regularly tested. Meanwhile, the planned switch-off of Digital Terrestrial Television risks weakening resilience by reducing access to information.

Information must be communicated clearly and consistently through multiple channels, including traditional media, digital platforms and social media, to reach as many people as possible.

Clear, trusted and timely communication is essential to ensuring that people understand the risks and can respond appropriately.

“No one channel for communicating with the public will ever be sufficient. People will lose a brochure, may never find the website and so on. Messages also need to be continuously repeated and updated.”
The National Preparedness Commission in written evidence to us

Communication must be geared towards giving people an active role in strengthening national resilience. They need to know what action to take and be empowered to act.

This can partly be achieved through education from an early age, covering practical skills, critical thinking and information literacy.

The Government should adopt a more open approach to communicating national risks. It should provide regular, accessible and candid information about significant risks, their potential consequences and the actions being taken to mitigate them, while explaining clearly what individuals and communities can do to prepare.

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Committee members photographed inside the British embassy in Finland, with the British Ambassador to Finland, Laura Davies, and the Ambassador of Finland to the UK, Teemu Turunen

4. A Focus on Finland

Our Committee visited Finland to experience its world-leading approach to resilience.

Finland differs from the UK, notably through its 830-mile border with Russia. But it still shares many of the same threats and can offer the UK valuable lessons from its decades of experience.

Finland’s preparedness rests on three layers:

  1. regulation for critical entities
  2. contractual arrangements with companies
  3. voluntary activity across the business community.

Its National Emergency Supply Agency analyses supply risks, identifies vulnerabilities and works with companies to address gaps in preparedness. Finland also builds relationships across government, business and civil society through conscription and national defence courses.

During our visit to Finland, we saw how this whole-of-society approach works in practice, including through a visit to a civil defence shelter in Kuopio.

We also heard how Finland maintains nine months of grain reserves, encourages households to keep 72 hours of essential supplies, and works with businesses to ensure that critical goods and services remain available during emergencies.

“The cornerstone of our preparedness lies in civil society preparedness. Businesses need to be ready, and they need to know their role. Every single citizen needs to know their role.”
HE Teemu Turunen, Finland’s Ambassador, in oral evidence to us

It views leadership not as a single person being in charge, but as effective co-ordination across society.

Finland also has significant stockpiles. It produces around 80% of its food domestically and holds nine months of grain reserves. Around half of its population follows guidance to keep 72 hours of essential supplies.

The Government should establish a national resilience course for senior leaders, modelled on Finland’s national defence courses, bringing together chief executives, directors, senior officials, parliamentarians, media professionals and leaders from civil society and faith organisations to build relationships and shared preparedness before crises occur.

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We believe there is a great opportunity for the UK to be a resilient nation with everyone knowing their role before and during any major incident.

The next crisis may be uncertain, but the need to prepare for it is not.

What happens next?

The committee meets with Scandinavian diplomats

We have made our recommendations to the Government and it now has two months to respond to our report.

Read the full report on our website.

Our committee is a special inquiry committee for 2026.

Find out more about our inquiry and our committee.

Follow us on LinkedIn.

Cover image: adragan - stock.adobe.com