Medicine security is a national priority


How can the UK increase its medicine resilience?

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Published 4 February 2026

Published 4 February 2026

Medicines are essential for the health of the nation, and therefore it is vital that the UK has strong, resilient medicine supply chains.

However, our inquiry into medicines security has concluded that there is a lack of oversight and coordination over medicine resilience, and concerns over medicines shortage are not seen as a security issue, potentially risking the health of patients.

In the UK, the vast majority of our medicines are manufactured, or reliant on key ingredients from, outside of the UK — primarily from India, China —  or from single sources, leading to reliance on a potentially fragile global supply chain.

Dynamic changes in geopolitics, trade, and the threat of natural disasters abroad mean that the UK could quickly be at risk of medicine shortages affecting patients up and down the country.

Medicine shortages mean that patients can suffer. For some, being unable to access medicines will cause stress and anxiety, with others being unable to alleviate their symptoms.

In the worst cases, those with chronic or debilitating conditions could face rapid deterioration in their health.

Here are the four key challenges

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1. A national security risk?

The UK is reliant on India and China for the vast majority of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) – the part of a medicine which makes you feel better.

Further, the majority of medicines used by the NHS are manufactured outside of the UK – some of which are from single sources, and many are from China.

“The UK is particularly exposed to such a heavy reliance on a single country.”
Written evidence from Sandoz UK

In the current unpredictable political climate, were concerned that a deterioration in relations between the UK and India or China could expose the UK to a shortage of critical medicines, putting patients at risk.

Further, where the UK is reliant on fragile or single-source supplies of critical medicines, unpredictable events such as natural disasters could quickly lead to medicine supply shortages with little time to prepare.

“Biological security is national security.”
Dr Martin Turner, Director of Policy and External Affairs at the Bioindustry Association, in oral evidence to us

Medicine supply should be included in the Government’s National Risk Register, with preparedness exercises focused on large-scale medicine and API failure, regularly undertaken.

2. Boosting medicines manufacturing

“80% of the API the UK uses comes from China and India.”
Malcolm Harrison, Chief Executive of the Company Chemists Association, in oral evidence to us

80% of the prescribed medicines the NHS uses are ‘generic’ medicines, which are medicines that can be made by any manufacturer.

But just a quarter of these drugs are made in the UK – with the rest being made largely in Europe and Asia.

The Government are taking steps to increase drugs manufacturing and encourage pharmaceutical companies to research and produce medicines in the UK, through the Life Sciences Sector Plan.

But the Government seem to be focused on researching and developing new, innovative medicines, and not on large scale production of generic medicines and ingredients which the NHS use.

When implementing the Life Sciences Sector Plan, the Office for Life Sciences should ensure that investment boosts the UK's generic and API manufacturing capacity. This investment should consider which medicines and APIs the UK Government views as critical for medicines security and resilience.

3. Current leadership and oversight

We are concerned there is little oversight or leadership from the Department of Health and Social Care of medicine stocks in the UK, nor the potential risks against critical medicines, whose absence would have significant impact on patients should they be in short supply.

“The wider systems suffers from a lack of coordination.”
Written evidence from National Clinical Homecare Association

Evidence from our inquiry suggests the Government do not take enough proactive steps to protect the UK from fragile supply chains.

We found they focus on reactive actions when shortages have already occurred, and do not effectively communicate shortages, or solutions, to frontline staff such as pharmacists and GPs.

Many stakeholders told us about the need for leadership and planning from Government in this area.

“The UK should have 'a strategic medicines security plan'.”
Written evidence from Medicines UK

There must be a named individual with the appropriate seniority and authority to oversee resilience in the UK’s medicine supply chain, working across Government to prioritise this issue, and ensuring data is shared with stakeholders so that patients do not miss out on their medication.

4. A Critical Medicines List

To make sure we have a secure supply of medicines, the Government need to make it clear which drugs they want manufactured on UK soil, and which they will get from other countries.

“No plans to create or publish a list of critical medicines in the United Kingdom.”
Written answer from The Department of Health and Social Care on this issue, Session 2024–2026

Some countries publish a ‘Critical Medicines List’ which sets out medicines they think are the most important to have a secure supply of – but the UK Government doesn’t do this.

Publishing a list would help manufacturers decide what medicines they should make, and what they should invest in.

It would also mean the Government could work with other countries, to avoid duplication and coordinate work to boost medicines supply chain resilience.

The Government should create a public Critical Medicines List and list of critical Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API), based on clinical priority and supply chain vulnerability. This would be used to inform UK production, potential medicines for stockpiling, contract negotiations, and international diplomatic deliberations.

What happens next?

We have made our recommendations to the Government and it has two months to respond to our report.

Read the full report on our website.

Find out more about our inquiry and our committee.

Follow us on LinkedIn and X (formerly Twitter).

Cover image credit: Anna Baranova - stock.adobe.com